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Abstract 
Cybercrime firms (CCFs) have significant global outreach. Combining insights from theories on white-
collar crime (WCC), international relations (IR)/international political economy (IPE) perspectives, 
export market selection process, and market failures, we analyze CCFs’ operations and 
internationalization. We present research findings from multiple case studies of CCFs to interrogate the 
above theories and to refine, extend and further develop their arguments. Extending WCC theory, 
resource constraints in countries with weak rule of laws result law enforcement apparatus’ inability to 
cope. The IR/IPE provides additional insights by explicating mechanisms by which an economy’s 
international integration can drive investments law enforcement resources. It explains the stages 
associated with CCFs’ export market selection processes. Finally, we view that CCFs make 
excess/supranormal profits, for which market failure is necessary.  
 
Keywords: cybercrime firms; cybersecurity; internationalization; jurisdictional arbitrage; supranormal 
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1. Introduction 
Some cybercrime firms (CCFs) have significant global outreach. For instance, the Conficker botnet 
reportedly controlled 7 million computer systems at 230 regional and country top-level domains (Mullins, 
2010). As of February 2016, a criminal gangs involved in the so called CEO frauds had victimized 
companies in 108 countries (Scannell, 2016).  Another similar example is Tartu, Estonia-based Rove 
Digital (RD). An international gang associated with RD used malicious software to hijack more than 4 
million computers in over 100 countries (Bray, 2011).  Some CCFs such as closely imitate business models 
of reputable legitimate corporations (Goodman, 2011; Kshetri, 2010).   
Two intriguing observations can be made regarding CCFs’ operations. First, many CCFs’ activities have 
been extremely profitable. For instance, RD made US$14 million in profits in less than five years of its 
operations (Kshetri, 2013). According to the Internet Crime Complaint Center (I3C), the criminal gang 
involved in CEO frauds made US$2 billion in a few years (Scannell, 2016). 
Second, there is generally an extremely low arrest and prosecution rates for cybercrimes. The U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated that the probability of a cybercriminal’s being caught was less 
than 1 in 20,000 and the overall conviction rate for a person accused of engaging in cybercrimes was 1 in 
22,000 (Gabrys, 2002).  
International business (IB) researchers typically study multinational enterprises (MNEs) engaged in 
formal, legal and legitimate economic activities crossing national borders.  And for many reasons these 
issues are considered to be important.  In some recent studies IB researchers have acknowledged the 
existence and importance of informal cross-border network organizations. By promoting the flow of 
economic and non-economic remittances in the forms of money and ideas, informal cross-border 
organizations such as diaspora networks have facilitated the formation and growth of new ventures 
(Oviatt & McDougall, 1994).  Examples of such activities include micro-enterprises in developing 
countries funded by migrant remittances from abroad (Vaaler, 2011).    




It is likely that some cross-border flows of money and ideas may shift from legally-questionable but 
legitimate business use (e.g., an unlicensed barbershop) to illegitimate business use (e.g., drug dealing). 
The focus of this paper is on the latter issue. CCF activities are cross-border in nature, organized with 
formally-defined or informally-understood responsibilities, not legally-sanctioned, and largely deemed as 
undesirable and thus illegitimate by community members, including those forced to "do business" with 
the CCFs.  
The idea in this paper is to analyze CCFs’ activities in ways that are analogous to other more conventional 
MNEs. Such an analysis helps researchers understand CCFs better. By developing a clearer understanding 
of how CCFs operate, organizations and individuals should be better able to defend against them and 
contribute to their control and eradication.  
There are two fundamental considerations. First, whereas legitimate firms voluntarily exchange goods 
and services, CCFs are engaged in illegal activities. This means that the key actors in CCF networks prefer 
to be in places which are beyond the reach of the law-enforcement efforts. Second, based on the examples 
presented above, it can be argued that some CCFs are making supranormal profits. Two natural questions 
arise: RQ1) what strategies are used by CCFs to maximize security? RQ2) what are the basic mechanisms 
associated with CCFs’ supranormal profits?  
At the outset it must be clearly stated that there obviously are methodological, conceptual, logical, and 
statistical challenges in researching CCFs’ internationalization. Nonetheless, instead of burying our heads 
under the sand, it would be better to address this issue with whatever clarity, rigor, and systematization 
that can be achieved.  
The theory that emerges is that in order to maximize security, CCFs locate their strategic resources in 
jurisdictions with weak rules of law and/or low degree of law enforcement cooperation with victims’ 
jurisdictions. In order to increase profitability, CCFs prefer pursuing targets that are characterized by 
weak cybersecurity (CS) mechanisms, high digitization of economic activities and low propensity to report 
to law enforcement agencies. Their modus operandi include relying on alliances that are physically located 
in the victims’ jurisdiction and  taking measures to make their virtual and physical activities undetectable 
and untraceable. 
2. Literature Review  
In order to analyze the jurisdictions in which CCFs tend to locate key resources, we apply two different 
theoretical frameworks.  The literatures on white-collar crime (WCC) could be particularly helpful for 
identifying important causes and dynamics associated with individuals’ engagement in cybercrime 
activities and the emergence of CCFs. Just like the WCCs (Tillman et al., 1996), cybercrime cases are 
complex and thus require substantial resources to investigate and prosecute. The international relations 
(IR)/international political economy (IPE) perspectives provides additional insights by explicating the 
mechanism by which an economy’s international integration can drive the investment in such resources. 
With the decline of violent geopolitical conflicts, traditional issues such as nuclear war are losing salience 
and the focus and organizing principle in international relations have been on nontraditional security 
issues (Andreas & Price, 2001). Cyber-threat is increasingly recognized as a legitimate security issue 
(Kshetri, 2013a). 
Next, most CCFs’ internationalization is more akin to export than foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
export market selection process is thus more relevant to the context of this paper than foreign market 
selection or international market selection (Papadopoulos & Denis, 1988). Note that the latter pertain to 
the evaluation of markets for possible entry by means of modes other than export such as FDI.   
Finally, one way to view CCFs’ operations is to say that they are making excess profits from their 
operations. Economic theory emphasizes the effectiveness of markets in limiting profits to an average 
level. Market failures are necessary for supranormal profits, which needs the presence of “impediments to 
economic activity” (Yao, 1988, p. 59).   





The approach of this study can be described as theory building from multiple case studies, which is 
becoming increasingly popular in social science (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Connection with related 
literatures, establishment of theoretical gaps in the literature, and explicit statement of research questions 
to address the gaps are the key features of strong empirical research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In 
qualitative research, it is also important to make a strong case for the importance of the research 
questions that have been raised (Bansal and Corley, 2012). We have established theoretical and practical 
importance of research on CCFs’ internationalization.  
Selection of cases 
A potentially valuable research design to test the conceptual framework via multiple case studies would be 
to sample CCFs that engaged in cybercrime activities for financial gains. It is important to include CCFs 
with different strategies and levels of success to keep them beyond the reach of law enforcement efforts 
(security) as well as those that pursue different markets and strategies for maximizing profitability. 
Multiple cases are chosen for theoretical reasons which include (contrary) replication, a theory’s extension 
and elimination of alternative explanations (Yin, 1994). In order to meet the above-mentioned criteria, a 
total of fifteen cases of CCFs have been selected.  
4. CCFs’ Internationalization Strategy and Processes 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggested providing a visual theory summary in the form of “boxes and 
arrows” diagram. To this end, Figure 1 presents a preliminary conceptual framework. In well-done case 
study research, theory and data are likely to be “patternmatched” and the propositions are consistent with 
most or all the cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In this regard, Table 1 provides a visual theory 
summary, matching with the cases.  
Maximizing security  
Location of strategic resources in jurisdiction with weak rules of law  
The criminal gangs operating Rustock (case 5), RBN (case 9), and Rock Fish malware (case 11) operated 
from Russia. In the widely publicized coreflood case, the FBI and the DOJ filed a civil complaint against 
13 "John Doe defendants", who were believed to be in Russia (case 1). Likewise, in the RD case, while the 
Estonian fraudsters were extradited to the U.S., one Russian involved in the case is on the loose (case 6). 
Another interesting observation is that Rustock had data centers in seven U.S. cities, where 96 servers had 
acted as the C&C system. The C&C servers were located in middle-America where it would face less 
regulatory scrutiny compared to major metropolitan areas (bbc.co.uk, 2011) (case 5). 
Limited organizational resources and high caseload pressures lead to some governments’ ability to 
investigate and prosecute (Pontell et al., 1994). Just like WCCs (Tillman et al., 1996), resource limitations 
are of particular concern for cybercrimes due to their complexity.  
Locating in countries with low degree of law enforcement cooperation with victims’ jurisdictions 
The RBN (Case 9) reportedly sold website hosting services to cybercriminals. Cybercrimes targeting 
foreign victims are committed from Russia almost with impunity (Krebs, 2007).  Regarding the operation 
of criminal gangs such as Rustock (case 5), RBN (case 9), and Rock Fish malware (case 11), Russia’s 
difference with the West in legal and law enforcement matters is important (e.g., Hathaway et al., 2012).  
One observation is that the founders of RD (case 6) could not protect themselves from law enforcement in 
Estonia.  International pressures have led to the modernization of Soviet–era legislative framework and 
institutional structures of Estonia. Due to Estonia’s high degree of integration with the west, 
cybercriminals are jurisdictionally “less shielded” compared to those in Russia. A similar conclusion can 
be deduced from a comparison of Russia and Ukraine. While Russia has established distance with the 
West, Ukraine has shown more willingness to cooperate and integrate. In 2010, the SBU arrested five 
alleged kingpins behind Zeus (case 3) (Onyshkiv & Bondarev, 2012). 
Maximizing profitability  
Pursuing targets with high digitization  




Online casinos, banks, and e-commerce hubs are an industry sweet spot (cases 3, 10, 13). Most CCFs have 
found the U.S. market as a lucrative target. Regarding CCFs’ market selection process (Kumar et al., 1994; 
Williamson et al., 2006), using variables specific to the cybercrime industry, while a short list may contain 
a number of countries, many CCFs chose the U.S. for the final selection.  Operations in the U.S. can lead 
to a higher profitability due to a large number of computers and high digitization. The banker malware 
(case 7) is detected only in Brazil (Kazymirsky et al., 2016). Brazilian CCFs have not realized the need for 
internationalizing due to well-developed domestic financial sector. 
Pursuing newer domains 
CCFs are finding it more attractive to monetize mobile malware. One example is Zitmo banking Trojan (or 
Zeus-in-the-Mobile) allegedly developed by the creators of Zeus (case 3). Likewise, RBN (case 9) stopped 
operations in November 2007. Some analysts suspected that “whatever protection RBN enjoyed was 
withdrawn because the group had overreached itself” (Espiner, 2007). Analysts also suggested that the 
group operating RBN may have shifted its operations to China and other Asian countries (Blakely et al., 
2007). In the same vein, following the seizure of Coreflood’s C&C servers by the  DoJ and the FBI in 2011, 
the malware evolved with more than 100 updates (case 1). Regarding the success of RD (case 6), it is 
worth noting that most traditional malware is designed to steal valuable personal information. RD’s 
scheme was on a newer domain and thus was not easily detected. Experts considered this as a very clever 
tactic as it manipulated the infrastructure of the Web involved in doing one of the most popular activities: 
display advertising. 
The above strategies can be considered to be an attempt to shift the underlying demand by filling the 
niches between existing products (Yao, 1988). The gang involved in the CEO fraud used the lure of 
promotion in order to defraud employees (case 14). This strategy can be considered as finding a new 
dimension of product space (Yao, 1988).  
Low propensity to report 
Internet gambling sites based in the Caribbean and Central America, most notably in Costa Rica, Aruba 
and Antigua, have been an easy target for online extortionists (case 10) (Kshetri, 2005). Such sites are 
illegal in the U.S. Police in these countries are poorly equipped to fight sophisticated cybercrimes (Baker, 
2004). Some casino operators face indictments in the U.S. on illegal gambling charges.  Law enforcement 
agencies such as the FBI do little to defend these sites. Grey-area businesses thus provide particularly 
appropriate examples.  
Regarding transactions costs, excluding nonbuyers from the use of a product or service (Yao 1988; Arrow 
1970) are key components. CCFs exclude law enforcement agencies from the access to information.  
Weak defense mechanism  
CCFs prefer to pursue targets with weak mechanisms. For instance, Zeus creator (case 3) reportedly found 
banks in Mexico and Chile as attractive targets as these banks employed weak single-factor authentication 
to secure their customers' accounts (Mathew, 2011). Likewise, out of 100,000 bots of Pushdo/Cutwail, 
40% were in India (case 8).  
Using the export market selection process, in the identification stage, variables specific to the product-
based industry are used to generate a short list of countries that warrant further investigation in the 
selection stage (Kumar et al., 1994). For CCFs, markets with a lack of CS orientation of individuals and 
organizations provide an attractive target. Such markets are more likely to be shortlisted by CCFs and 
subsequently pursued.  
Pursuing victims in physically accessible jurisdictions 
Many Nigerian cybercriminals face barriers to travel to the U.S. due to strict immigration controls. They 
focus on developing economies such as India (case 4). Note that in the final stage of the export market 
selection process, firm specific criteria are used (Kumar et al., 1994; Williamson et al., 2006). Some CCFs 
exclude countries that cannot be accessed physically.  In such cases, they focus on physically accessible 
jurisdictions, that is, those in which it is possible to make a physical presence. 
Prior research indicates that political factors act as barriers to MNEs’ activities in foreign locations 
(Dunning, 1988). Sinuraja (1995) observed that freer movement of people from the FSU economies to the 
West and vice versa stimulated the growth of organized economic crimes in FSU economies. For instance, 




members of Russian organized crime groups intensified their efforts in gathering necessary information 
and formed networks (Williams, 1995). 
Establishment of predatory groups in foreign markets 
The Zeus creators (case 3) deployed predatory money mule gangs in the U.S. and the U.K.  The stolen 
funds were transferred using money transfer agencies such as Western Union. The New York-based gang 
was operated by a Russian who supplied the mules with fake identity documents, and managed their 
activities. The gang stole over US$3 million from victims (Krebs, 2010).  In 2010, the U.S. attorney’s office 
in New York charged 37 defendants. It was noted that four of the defendants were “managers”, “a few 
others” were recruiters, and the rest were mules.  
Having predatory gangs in victims’ jurisdiction can help address the problems of incomplete markets and 
transactions costs. This is because various market participants have different goals and may act 
opportunistically in pursuit of those goals (Williamson, 1975). The significant presence of transactions 
costs can make it more attractive to replace market arrangements with nonmarket arrangements such as 
vertical integration (Yao, 1988).  
Creation of reputation  
If users of machines infected by the banker malware (case 7) attempt to connect to their banks’ websites, 
they are referred to fake login webpages (Kazymirsky et al., 2016). Similarly, in Dyre (case 13), when the 
infected victim tries to log in to bank websites, a new screen asks the victim to call a number to get help 
logging in. The criminals complete the wire transfer as soon as the victim hangs up the phone (Kuhn, 
2015).In the CEO fraud (case 14), the phony accounts created to mimic the KPMG lawyer used the suffix 
@kpmg-office.com to trick individuals (Scannell, 2016).  
Online extortionists rely on a different way to create and use reputation. After cracking into victims’ 
computer systems, extortionists normally send e-mails demanding that ransoms as high as US$100,000 
be sent via money transfer agencies (case 10). Gambling sites alone pay out millions of dollars in extortion 
money each year (Kshetri, 2005).  
The prevalence of imperfect information (Yao, 1988) is probably the most important source of 
vulnerability that CCFs can exploit. Uninformed Internet users are more likely to fall victim to CCFs’ 
tactics.  In the above cases, CCFs attempted to create a false reputation, which has been possible due to 
anonymity of the Internet.   
Undetectability/untraceability of virtual and physical actions  
Nigerian scammers (case 4), who targeted vulnerable Indian job-seekers by promising fake jobs, had 
opened accounts in India’s ICICI bank using fake documents (Ali, 2010). They bought data cards using 
someone else’s identity. A version of Android malware found in China (case 12) automatically deletes 
messages sent from infected numbers to premium services (Nichols, 2011). The banker malware (case 7) 
and other Brazilian CCFs employ techniques to maintain stealthiness. In order to remain undetected, the 
banker malware changes basic security configurations. It turns off antivirus and firewall notifications, and 
disables browser certificate verification (Kazymirsky et al., 2016).  
Regarding transactions costs as impediments to economic activity (Yao 1988), Arrow (1970), the costs 
associated with excluding nonbuyers from the use of a product or service and the costs of communication 
and information are key components. Related to the first category of costs, a main goal for most CCFs is to 
prevent non-victims from becoming aware of their tactics. In addition to non-victims, CCFs also want to 
make sure that law enforcement agencies and CS organization are not aware of the tactics.  
5. Discussion and Implications  
Prior researchers have noted that there is a relative dearth of research related to the entrepreneurial 
process and related economic activities in the informal economy (Webb et al., 2009). This article 
addresses the dearth of literature by providing an analysis of special type of informal economy: 
cybercrime. It sheds some light on the CCFs’ entrepreneurial activities by explicating the mechanisms by 
which they balance security and profitability expectations. Profitability is a function of targets selected 
and tactics used to victimize the targets and launder crime proceeds.   




Figure 1 helps us see how various issues related to CCFs are different in an international context than in a 
purely domestic context. For instance, in some cases, jurisdictional arbitrage can only be accomplished by 
pursuing foreign victims. Also one way to benefit from such arbitrage is to victimize businesses and 
consumers in a country in which the home country government has a low degree of law enforcement 
cooperation. Second, foreign countries may be characterized by a higher density of profitable victims that 
are attractive and accessible. For instance, cybercrime strategies involving newer technological domains 
may be more suited to pursue foreign victims. Likewise, foreign locations can have potential victims that 
are highly digitized, exhibit low propensity to report and have weaker CS mechanisms. Finally some of the 
elements of the model (e.g., portability) are only relevant for foreign operations.  
The various elements related to target selection in Figure 1 indicate that CCFs and legitimate firms are 
likely to differ in the criteria used in the export market selection. Countries with high density of grey area 
digital businesses (e.g., online betting websites) which have low propensity to report crimes to law 
enforcement agencies are likely to be shortlisted and finally selected by CCFs.  These features may not be 
of interest to most legitimate firms.  The above discussion also suggests that firm-specific strategic and 
business focus considerations determine CCFs’ target selection, victimizing tactics and laundering of 
crime proceeds in order to maximize profitability.  For instance, less-capable CCFs may focus efforts in 
pursuing victims with weak defense mechanism but that are less digitized and hence less attractive. More 
capable CCFs, on the other hand, may choose to target highly digitized victims or may focus efforts on 
















Weak rules of law • Coreflood’s  "John Doe defendants" believed to be in Russia [1].  
• IMU established in Ukraine by Westerners [2]  
• Nigerian CCFs see India as a low risk country to operate [4] 
• RD: Estonian alleged fraudsters were extradited to the U.S., one Russian 
involved in the case is on the loose [6]   




• Rock Fish malware  operated from Russia [11]   
• RBN sold website hosting services to cybercriminal [9].  
Target selection 
 
High digitization • Online casinos, banks, e-commerce hubs are attractive [3, 10, 13]   
• The banker malware detected only in Brazil  [7]   
Newer domains • Zitmo banking Trojan [3]   
• Ppromotion as an incentive to motivation and commitment [14]   
• RD manipulated the infrastructure of the Web [6]. 
Low propensity to 
report 
• Grey-area businesses such as gambling sites based in the Caribbean and 
Central America are easy target for online extortionists [10]    
• Some casino operators face indictments in the U.S.   
Weak defense 
mechanism 
• Zeus found banks in Mexico and Chile as attractive targets [3]    
• Most bots of Pushdo/Cutwail were in India [8]    
Physically accessible  
jurisdictions 
• Nigerian gangs focus on developing economies such as India [4].  




crime proceeds  
 
Predatory groups in 
foreign markets 
• The Zeus creators deployed predatory money mule gangs in the U.S. and the 




• Banker [3]   and Dyre [13] malware: fake login webpage.  
• CEO fraud, the phony accounts to mimic the KPMG lawyer [14] 
Undetectability 
/untraceability of 
virtual and physical 
actions 
• The banker malware changes basic security configurations [7]   
• Nigerian scammers opened accounts in India’s ICICI bank using fake 
documents [4]. 
• Android malware found in China automatically deletes messages sent from 
numbers associated with premium services [12] 
Table 1:  Understanding CCFs’ internationalization activities. 
 





Andreas P. and Price R. 2001. “ From war fighting to crime fighting: transforming the American National 
Security State”. International Studies Review 3(3), pp. 31–52. 
Dunning, JH. 1993. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Wokingham: Addison Wesley. 
Eisenhardt KM. and Graebner ME. 2007. “Theory building from cases: opportunities and challenges”. 
Academy of Management Journal 50(1), pp. 25-32.  
Goodman M. 2011. “What Business can learn from organized crime. Harvard Business Review, 89(11) pp.  
27-30 
Greene D. and David JL. 1984. “A research design for generalizing from multiple case studies”. Evaluation 
and program planning, 7, pp. 73–85 
Guillén MF. and García-Canal E. 2009. “The American Model of the Multinational Firm and the "New" 
Multinationals from Emerging Economies”. Academy of Management Perspectives 23(2), pp.  23-35 
Guthrie, D., 1999. Dragon in a Three-piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ and Oxford. 
Hagan, J . and Parker, P. (1985). “White-collar crime and punishment: class structure and legal 
sanctioning of securities violations”. American Sociological Review, 50, pp.  302–316.  
Hathaway, O.A., Crootof, R., Perdue, W and Levitz, P. 2012. “The Law of Cyber-attack”, California Law 
Review 100:817–885. 
Hattari R. and Rajan RS. 2010. “India as a Source of Outward Foreign Direct Investment”. Oxford 
Development Studies 38 (4), pp.  497-518 
Kumar V, Stam A. and Erich AJ. 1994. “An Interactive Multicriteria Approach to Identifying Potential 
Foreign Markets”. Journal of International Marketing 2 (1), pp.  29–52. 
Mullins, R. 2010. “ The biggest cloud on the planet is owned by ... the crooks: Security expert says the 
biggest cloud providers are botnets”. http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/58829?t51hb 
(Accessed July 24, 2010). 
North, D.C. “Dealing with a Nonergodic World: Institutional Economics, Property Rights, and the Global 
Environment”.  Duke Environment, Law, and Policy Forum, 1999: 10(1), pp.  1–12. 
Onyshkiv, Y. and Bondarev, A. (2012). “Ukraine thrives as cybercrime haven”, March 8, 
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/123965/. 
Oviatt B. and McDougall P. 1994. “Toward a theory of international new ventures”. Journal of 
International Business Studies 25(1), pp.  45-64. 
Papadopoulos N. and Jean-Emile D. 1988. “Inventory, Taxonomy and Assessment of Methods for 
International Market Selection”. International Marketing Review, 5 (3), pp. 38–51. 
Pigato M. 2000. Information and Communication Technology, Poverty and Development in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Pontell H, Calavita K. and Tillman R. 1994. “Corporate crime and criminal justice system capacity: 
government response to financial institution fraud”. Justice Quarterly 11: 385–410. 
Rui H. and  Yip GS. 2008. “Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent perspective”. Journal 
of World Business, 43, pp.  213–226 
Shapiro, S. (1990). “Collaring the crime, not the criminal: reconsidering the concept of white-collar crime. 
American Sociological Review”, 55, pp. 346–365. 
Sinuraja T. 1995. “Internationalization of organized economic crime, The Russian Federation case”. 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 3(4), pp. 34-53 
Tillman, R., Calavita, K. and Pontell, H. 1996. “Criminalizing white-collar misconduct: determinantsof 
prosecution in savings and loan fraud cases”. Crime Law and Social Change, 26(1), pp. 53–76. 
Vaaler P. 2011. “Immigrant remittances and the venture investment environment of developing 
countries”. Journal of International Business Studies 42 (9), pp.  1121–1149. 
Webb, J.W., Tihanyi, L., Ireland, R.D. and Sirmon, D.G. 2009. “You say illegal, I say legitimate: 
entrepreneurship in the informal economy”, Academy of Management Review, 34(3), pp. 492–510. 
Wijnberg, N. M. 1995. “Selection processes and appropriability in art, science and technology Journal of 
Cultural Economics”, 19 (3), pp. 221-235 
Williams P. 1995. “Transnational criminal organizations: strategic alliances. The Washington Quarterly, 
pp. 59-67 
Williamson NC, Kshetri N, Heijwegen T. and Schiopu A. 2006. “An Exploratory Study of the Functional 
Forms of Export Market Identification Variables”.  Journal of International Marketing 14(1), pp. 71-
97. 




Woodruff, C. and Zenteno, R. 2007. “Migration networks and microenterprises in Mexico”. Journal of 
Development Economics, 82, pp. 509–28. 
Yao, D.A. 1988. “Beyond the reach of the invisible hand: Impediments to economic activity, market 
failures, and profitability”. Strategic Management Journal, 9(S1), pp. 59–70.  
Yin R. 1994. Case Study Research: Design And Methods (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
